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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
KATIE SHAFER, : 
Plaintiff Appellant, : Case No. 20020120-SC 
v. : 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action on October 6, 2000 (R. 1-3), alleging 
that she sustained injuries while deboarding a rail car operated by the Heber Valley 
Historic Railroad Authority. After the pleadings were amended, the State filed a motion 
to dismiss (R. 70-71) and supporting memorandum (R. 60-69) based on plaintiffs failure 
to strictly comply with the notice-of-claim requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. The motion was granted by memorandum decision entered January 16, 
2002. Prior to the entry of an order of dismissal with prejudice dated March 4 and filed 
March 5, 2002 (R. 119-20), plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on February 11,2002 
(R. 111-12). Under Utah R. App. P. 4(c), the premature notice is deemed timely as of the 
date the final order was entered. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (Supp. 2001), as taken from an order over which the Utah Court 
of Appeals lacks original appellate jurisdiction. 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
1. Does a notice of claim against the State addressed to the attorney general at a 
satellite office location fulfill the statutory requirement of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii) (Supp. 2001) that notice be "directed and delivered to: . . . (E) the 
attorney general11? 
Plaintiff fails to identify, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5(A), the point in the 
record at which this issue was preserved. While she did raise the issue generally in her 
memorandum opposing the State's motion to dismiss (see R. 72-77), she did not make any 
argument in the district court based on evidentiary presumptions created by Utah Code 
Ann. § 68-3-8.5 (Supp. 2001) or its predecessor statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-37-1 and 
-2 (1997). Nor did she contend in the district court that under the rules of statutory 
construction contained in section 68^3-12 (Supp. 2001), the legislature intended the 
statute to authorize delivery of notice to someone other than the incumbent holder of the 
official title. Consequently, these arguments, addressed in Point I of plaintiff s brief 
(Aplt. Brief at 4-9), have been waived and are not properly before this Court for review. 
2 
See Connor v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 972 P.2d 414, 418 (Utah 1998) (declining to address 
argument not raised below). 
Standard of Review: 
Compliance with the Immunity Act is a prerequisite to vesting a 
district court with subject matter jurisdiction over claims against 
governmental entities. Accordingly, a district court's dismissal of a case 
based on governmental immunity is a determination of law that we afford 
no deference. We review such conclusions for correctness. 
Wheeler v. McPherson. 2002 UT 16, ^9, 40 P.3d 632 (citations omitted). 
2. Where a claim is made against the State, does a notice of claim sent to the 
executive director of an independent state agency satisfy the notice requirements of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act? 
Plaintiff likewise fails to identify, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A), the 
point in the record at which this issue was preserved. She did, however, raise the issue in 
her memorandum opposing the Stated motion to dismiss. See R. 76-77. 
Standard of Review: This issue also involves dismissal of a case based on 
governmental immunity and is reviewed without deference foncorrectness. Wheeler. 
2002 UT 16 at U9. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the 
issues before the Court is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
Plaintiff filed her complaint and jury demand on October 6, 2000 (R. 1-3), seeking 
damages for injuries she sustained while exiting the Heber Creeper, a train operated for 
scenic and historic purposes. The complaint was subsequently amended (R. 8-12) to 
allege compliance with the notice-of-claim requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act (R. 9, «f 6). The State answered (R. 13-18), raising as a defense that the 
claim is barred by the immunity act's provisions (R. 17, Ninth Defense). After a 
substitution of its counsel (R. 26-27), the State moved to amend its answer (R. 28-39) in 
order to expressly raise a jurisdictional defense (R. 31). The motion was granted 
(R. 50-51 and 56-57) over plaintiffs objection (R. 40-44). 
Following the filing of its amended answer (R. 52-55), the State moved to dismiss 
the case for lack of jurisdiction (R. 60-71) on the ground that plaintiffs notice of claim 
was not served in compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (Supp. 2001). 
Memoranda were exchanged (R. 72-84 (plaintiffs opposition) and 89-92 (the State's 
4 
reply)), and a hearing was held on December 13, 2001 (R. 106). On January 16, 2002, 
the trial court judge issued a memorandum decision (R. 107-10) dismissing the claim for 
plaintiffs failure to properly serve her notice of claim on the attorney general. The court 
explicitly rejected plaintiffs alternative argument that notice to the executive director of 
the Heber Valley Historic Railroad sufficed to satisfy plaintiffs statutory duty of notice 
(R. 109). Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on February 11, 2002 (R. 111-12), which 
became effective when the order dismissing the case with prejudice was issued on March 
5, 2002 (R. 119-20). 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
Following plaintiffs June 23, 1999 injury, plaintiffs counsel submitted a notice of 
claim dated May 2, 2000 (R. 35-38 and 65-68). The notice was addressed to Craig H. 
Lacey, the Railroad's executive director, in Heber City, Utah, and to MJan Graham, Utah 
State Attorney General, 515 E. 100 S., Salt Lake City, Ut. 84101" (R. 35 and 65). A 
certified mail receipt shows that Dawn Grams signed for the copy of the notice directed to 
Craig Lacey on June 7, 2000 (R. 44_and 83). A second certified mail receipt for the copy 
directed to Jan Graham is simply stamped, "RECEIVED JUN 08 2000 Utah State MailM 
(R. 44 and 81). In pages bearing the identification "qwestdex.com," attached as Exhibit A 
to plaintiffs memorandum opposing the State's motion to dismiss, the sole entry for 515 
5 
East 100 South, Salt Lake City, is the Child Support Division of the Attorney General's 
Office (R. 79). 
No other facts are relevant to the issues before this Court for decision. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court has long held that the notice-of-claim provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act require strict compliance. Absent strict compliance, a claim 
under the act must be dismissed. Recent decisions have reemphasized that a claim cannot 
go forward unless the notice of claim fully complies with the statutory mandates. See, 
e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit Auth.. 2001 UT 109, 37 P.3d 1156; Brown v. Utah Transit 
AutL, 2002 UT 15, 40 P.3d 638. 
The sole defendant named in this case is the State of Utah. Statute is clear that for 
claims against the State, the notice of claim must be directed and delivered to the attorney 
general. In this case, the district court correctly held that a notice sent to a division within 
the Attorney General's Office cannot substitute for delivery to the individual serving as 
the State's attorney general. As the district court correctly observed, a contrary decision 
would lead to the kind of uncertainty regarding notice that the statutory requirements 
exist to eliminate. 
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Because plaintiffs notice of claim did not strictly comply with the statute 
governing claims against the State, the district court's dismissal of the claim was correct 
and is entitled to this Court's affirmance. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DIRECTING AND DELIVERING NOTICE TO A SATELLITE 
DIVISION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE DIRECTION AND DELIVERY TO THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act controls all claims for injury against 
governmental entities: 
Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, 
or against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the 
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity 
before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (Supp. 2001). The requirement to file a written notice of 
claim is mandatory. The statute further prescribes the person to whom notice must be 
provided. In each case, the notice is to be directed and delivered to a specified individual: 
(b) (ii) (A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is against an 
incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when 
the claim is against a school district or board of education; 
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(D) the president or secretary of the board, when the claim is against 
a special district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of Utah; 
or 
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or 
executive secretary, when the claim is against any other public board, 
commission, or body. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii) (Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). As the Court 
observed in Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, prior to 1998 the notice provisions were 
somewhat ambiguous regarding the identity of the person to whom notice must be 
delivered. However, in 1998 the legislature clarified the delivery requirements to make 
explicit "how, what, when, and to whom a party must direct and deliver a Notice in order 
to preserve his or her right to maintain an action against a governmental entity." Greene, 
2001 UT 109,1J15. In the Court's words, the amendment "has resolved any potential 
ambiguities as to whom the Notice must be delivered." Id. at [^14. The Court concluded 
that "[w]here, as here, the statute is clear, readily available, and easily accessible by 
counsel, there is no reason to require anything less than strict compliance." Id. at ^[14. 
Plaintiff makes two arguments based on statute: first, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 68-3-8.5 (Supp. 2001), that the existence of a certified mail receipt raises an evidentiary 
presumption that the certified mail has been delivered to the person to whom it was 
addressed; and second, under section 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii), that under the rules of statutory 
construction, the statute contemplates receipt by someone other than the attorney general. 
8 
As noted above, these arguments were not made in the district court and are consequently 
waived for purposes of appeal. 'This rule is based, in part, on the principle that it is 
unfair to fault the court for failing to rule correctly on an issue it was never given the 
opportunity to consider." Ellis v. Swensen. 2000 UT 101, [^30, 16 P.3d 1233. Plaintiff 
has neither acknowledged this principle nor provided any rationale for ignoring it. 
Moreover, even if the Court were to reach these newly raised arguments, neither supports 
plaintiff s position. 
The Court's observation in Greene that the amendment of section 63-30-11 
"clarified] exactly to whom Notices must be directed and delivered" (2001 UT 109, |^13) 
forecloses plaintiffs contention that receipt of notice by someone other than the attorney 
general is consistent with the statute (see Aplt. Brief at 5). Her citation to the rules of 
construction contained in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2)(v) for the proposition that 
"attorney general" includes other individuals who perform duties falling within the 
attorney general's purview is unavailing. The language of subsection (2)(v), in contrast to 
other subsections of the same statute, is permissive, not mandatory: "words used to 
denote an executive or ministerial officer, may include any . . . other person performing" 
the same duties. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2)(v) (Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). Every 
other subsection but one uses the word "includes" or "means" as its operating verb instead 
of the permissive or conditional language; the definition of "town" in subsection (2)(y), 
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which "may mean incorporated town and may include city," is the sole exception (Utah 
Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2)(y) (Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). It is clear from this disparity 
that the distinction between the mandatory and permissive language is intentional. To 
hold otherwise would deprive the word "may" of meaning, contrary to the principles of 
statutory interpretation articulated by this Court: "We will avoid an interpretation which 
renders portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or inoperative." Platts v. Parents 
Helping Parents. 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997). Further, "the word 'may' in its most 
usual meaning does not import certainty, but uncertainty. That is, that whatever is 
referred to, either may or may not be, or occur." Grant v. Utah State Land Bd.. 485 P.2d 
1035, 1036 (Utah 1971) (footnote omitted). Consequently, the "rule" cited by plaintiff 
does not support her conclusion that the immunity act's statutory reference to "attorney 
general" necessarily includes others performing ancillary duties. 
Finally, in construing a statute, "[foundational rules require that we assume that 
each term of a statute was used advisedly; and that each should be given an interpretation 
and application in accord with their [sic] usually accepted meaning, unless the context 
otherwise requires." Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 742 
(Utah 1996), overruled in part on other grounds by Spackman v. Bd. of Educ, 2000 UT 
87, 16 P.3d 533; Nelson v. Salt Lake County. 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995). Especially 
in the context of a list of specific individuals to whom notice must be directed and 
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delivered, interpreting section 63-30-1 l's reference to "the attorney general" as including 
someone other than the elected official would contradict both the usually accepted 
meaning of the phrase and the context in which it is placed, contrary to the principles 
under which the Court interprets statutory language. In accord with these principles, "the 
attorney general" in section 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(E) refers to the individual who holds that 
office. Plaintiff has provided no contrary authority. 
Plaintiffs reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-8.5 is equally misplaced.1 Her 
argument that a certified mail receipt evidences receipt by the person to whom the mail 
was directed "at a listed address" (Aplt. Brief at 5) proves too much. Under her theory, 
she could address a document by certified mail to, for example, the president of a major 
university at a remote "listed" campus or to the chief executive officer of a national 
corporation at a "listed" manufacturing facility far from the corporate headquarters. As 
long as someone, with or without authority, signed the return receipt, the document would 
be deemed delivered to the addressee. In this case, plaintiff did not use the listed address 
for the executive offices of the Attorney General but directed her notice of claim to an 
address specified only for the Child Support Division (see R. 79-80). Such misdirection 
Section 68-3-8.5 was no effective until April 30, 2001, well after plaintiff filed her 
notice of claim in this case. However, the language on which her argument relies was 
formerly found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-2 (1997). 
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does nothing to provide the notice she argues the statute is intended to confer. Moreover, 
notice to an assistant attorney general in a satellite office has been held by the Utah Court 
of Appeals not to suffice for notice to the attorney general. See Thimmes v. Utah State 
Univ., 2001 UT App 93, f7, 22 P.3d 257 (holding notice to the Division of Risk 
Management "because an assistant attorney general maintains an office there" ineffective 
to comply with statute). 
Plaintiff argues that "[i]f the person receiving the certified mail was unauthorized 
to accept it, it would have been rejected and Katie Shafer would have sought to deliver it 
to a person who could receive notice" (Aplt. Brief at 6). The mail receipt on which 
plaintiff relies (R. 44 and 81) shows only that it was stamped "RECEIVED JUN 08 2000 
Utah State Mail." Because nothing indicates that State Mail is unauthorized to accept 
documents directed to the Child Support Division under the Attorney General's name for 
purposes of that Division, there is no reason to believe that State Mail had a duty to reject 
a document sent to that address. Rather, it is plaintiffs legal duty to direct and deliver her 
notice of claim to the individual explicitly identified by statute. 
By suggesting that another person would be authorized to receive the notice of 
claim, plaintiff ignores the plain language of the statute and attempts to reintroduce the 
very ambiguity into the notice provision that this Court has held the 1998 amendment 
cured. What plaintiff seeks, at bottom, is an "actual notice" standard: "Dismissal was 
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inappropriate and must be reversed because there can be no question that the attorney 
general received notice of claim11 (Aplt. Brief at 6). The Court has repeatedly and 
conclusively rejected this position. See, e.g., Scarborough v. Granite Sch. DisU 531 P.2d 
480, 482 (Utah 1975) ("We have consistently held that where a cause of action is based 
upon a statute, full compliance with its requirements is a condition precedent to the right 
to maintain a suit"); Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 1999 UT 36, T|19, 977 P.2d 1201 ("We 
have consistently required strict compliance with the requirements of the Immunity Act. 
Actual notice does not cure a party's failure to meet these requirements"); Greene. 2001 
UT 109, ^ |15, 37 P.3d 1156. Given these precedents and the plain language of the statute, 
plaintiff has provided no grounds on which to disturb the district court's decision. 
II. NOTICE PROVIDED TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF AN 
INDEPENDENT STATE AGENCY DOES NOT FULFILL THE 
STATUTORY MANDATE FOR NOTICE TO THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL. 
Plaintiff briefly argues that section 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(F) provides an alternative to 
notice on the attorney general because the Heber Valley Historic Railroad Authority, 
which operates the Heber Creeper, "is a public corporation created by statute'1 (Aplt. Brief 
at 13). She contends that the notice of claim delivered to Craig Lacey, the Authority's 
executive director, is sufficient to fulfill her statutory duty of notice. See Aplt. Brief at 
13-14 ("Based on the admission by the State that it maintains Heber Valley and the 
13 
receipt of notice by Mr. Lacey, the district court erred in concluding that notice to be 
ineffective. Accordingly, the dismissal must be reversed because all pleadings and 
admissions indicate adequate notice was delivered11). 
The statute belies plaintiffs construction. Under section 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(F), 
notice upon Mr. Lacey as executive director of the Heber Valley Historic Railroad 
Authority would be effective only were the claim against a public board, commission, or 
body other than the State or the entities specifically listed in subparts (b)(ii)(A) through 
(D) of the statute. Because the State is the sole defendant in the present case, any notice 
to Mr. Lacey is irrelevant to the determination of whether the attorney general was 
adequately served.2 Again, plaintiff is relying on an "actual notice11 standard for which 
she neither provides case precedent nor acknowledges precedents against her position. 
Her abbreviated analysis cannot be credited and provides no basis to reverse the district 
court's dismissal of the case. 
2Plaintiff s invitation to stay this appeal pending the outcome of a newly filed case 
(see Aplt. Brief at 14 n.3) should be rejected. The issues that she identifies the new case 
as raising, application of the savings statute and governmental function analysis, are not 
relevant to the issue before the Court in the present case; however, the resolution of the 
present case may well affect the viability of a new trial court action. Moreover, no 
motion to stay has been properly submitted for the Court's consideration. 
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CONCLUSION 
The notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act unmistakably identify 
the attorney general as the individual to whom notice of a claim against the State must be 
directed and delivered. Mailing notice to a subsidiary office staffed only by assistant 
attorneys general does not comply with the statute. Because, as the Court has held, the 
statute is clear and unambiguous, it requires strict compliance. The district court 
correctly concluded that plaintiff did not comply with the statute's strictures, and its 
dismissal of plaintiff s claim on this ground warrants affirmance here. 
For these reasons, as more fully explained above, the State respectfully requests 
the Court to affirm the district court's judgment of dismissal. 
DATED this ^ 4 i day of June, 2002. 
<^ZjUC 
NANCY L. KEMP 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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